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FEDERAL DEPARTMENTAL PRACTICE.'
The subject which has been assigned to me is hardly
capable of the precise treatment which is customary in the dis-
cussion of questions of law. No doubt some of my colleagues
remember my method as a lecturer while a member of the Law
School faculty. My well known disposition to disregard the
letter of the law, in order that its spirit may be correspond-
ingly served has, I imagine, induced the committee to select
for me a subject that allows of considerable latitude in its
consideration.
I can not believe that at this time it would be safe to speak
of settled departmental practice. Rules have no doubt been
adopted in every department, but it is my impression that they
are not common to all the departments, and I am very clear
that in the great field of modern administrative development
departmental practice is only in the making. The one trend
which I think is clearly marked is the disposition in all inde-
pendent administrative bodies to provide for hearings, and
in many respects to adopt in some degree at least the methods
of regular courts.
1. Address by Hon. Charles Nagel delivered before the St. Louis Bar Asso-
ciation on April 16, 1923.
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Before entering upon the particular discussion of my sub-
ject, it would be interesting, if time permitted, to give a picture
of the composition of executive branches, the relation of each
to the chief executive, the relation which they bear to each
other, and, finally, the relation which they sustain to the two
other great departments of the government. For illustration,
it is generally overlooked that by degrees Congress has im-
posed upon members of the cabinet distinct duties, the en-
forcement of which it might sometimes be difficult to reconcile
with the decision of the President himself. Again, the oppor-
tunity for voluntary co-operation and for co-ordination by
legislative act between the departments 'vould afford a fit
subject for an entire address. The inevitable grasp for power
hlas made it difficult to accomplish as much in this direction as
conditions seem to demand. Nevertheless, the movement which
was inaugurated during President Taft's administration has
made distinct progress, and the further advance during the
Harding administration must be accepted as proof that public
opinion has been sufficiently crystallized to make a decided
impression.
The relation of the executive departments to the legisla-
tive branch is of course very close, by reason of the power
which can always be exercised by means of appropriation.
That this power is sometimes abused can not be questioned,
but, on the other hand, it should not be left out of mind that
this is an inherent power reserved to Congress which call
umder no circumstances be surrendered. Any attempt, for
instance, to interpret the budget system as affording a re-
straint upon this legislative discretion can only result in a
set back for the budget system itself.
However, the relation of the executive branches to both
the legislative and the judicial departments is important for
the discussion of my subject, chiefly because of the modern




embracing the exercise of both legislative and judicial
discretion.
This brings me to the question which I regard as the one
of most immediate moment. There is an undoubted trend to
enlarge the power of the executive branch by u gradual dele-
gation to it of mixed powers-partly legislative and partly
judicial. This trend marks a decided departure from the
earlier conception of the three distinct branches of govern-
nient. At least two lecturers who have participated in this
course (Prof. Freund and Judge Pound) dealt with the sig-
nificance of this movement, and undertook to define the pur-
pose and the limitations of such delegation of authority. The
same question is considered in the articles by E. F. Alberts-
worth and Warren H. Pillsbury in the Harvard Law Review
of December, 1921, and February, 1923, respectively.
We had lived in the complacent belief that when the form
of a free government was adopted our problem had been
solved. We were unmindful of the fact that every form of
government depends for its guaranty of freedom upon the
use to which it is practically put. Freedom and prosperity
can not be made secure by providing for them in the books.
Their achievement depends in a large measure upon the
manner in which our rules of conduct are employed.
We found of late years that the sharp distinction of three
departments might be suitable for our country in the early
days; but as the conditions and need for their control became
more complicated and novel, we realized that no one distinct
department could deal with them alone; and we resorted to
the employment of a combination of authority to obtain our
results. Instead of adhering to the old distinction, we bowed
to necessity; and when the constitutional right to do this was
challenged, we had the letter of the constitution yield to the
spirit of the demand.
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We were unwilling to be left unequipped for any necessi-
ties which the complication of our conditions and the sim-
plicity of our system presented. Even in the early days, with
respect to the much treasured distinction of reserved rights
in the States and delegated rights in the Federal Government,
it was pointed out that no zone can be left uncovered, and
that in case of necessity, either one of the authorities provided
for, or both combined, must be invoked.
Similarly, our National Government can not be permitted
to fail for the technical reason that neither branch is ex-
clusively charged with the performance of a particular act.
Although some of the anti-trust laws read like bills of par-
ticulars in indictments, Congress must practically be content
to make general rules. It can not prescribe in official detail
for every contingency. Performance must finally be left to
the executive in the exercise of a much needed discretion. If
the exercise of that discretion is inextricably tied up with
judicial opinion, the courts will say, as they have said, that
where neither of the other departments is clearly encroached
upon the courts will not interfere for the protection of either.
We have here the best possible illustration of that natural
growth of government for which the Anglo-Saxon has been
noted. It may be admitted that with respect to principles he
has been a great borrower; but when it comes to the actual
application and employment of principles, guided by the in-
fluence of common sense, the Anglo-Saxon has no equal in
history.
There is no question of this trend to lodge in the executive
'branch delegated authority from the other two branches. But
in thus endeavoring to meet modern problems forced upon
us, we must not be unmindful of a corresponding danger. The
arbitrary rule from which our free institutions were thought
to protect us, may be re-introduced in this fashion. Perhaps




government to realize that a ruthless majority may be as
-oppressive and as mischievous as a monarch. Professor Bur-
gess has shown in his book, "Reconciliation of Government
and Liberty," how far we are from having solved the problem
of self-government with due regard to the liberty of the indi-
vidual man. Francis Lieber (distinguished writer upon po-
litical science), asked to be remembered for one thing, and
that was that he had been the first to warn against democratic
absolutism. No one will deny that a tendency sufficiently
strong before the war has been tremendously aggravated by
the exigencies of war. We were virtually taught to disregard
the constitution to save it. The mere mandate of the law,
when it stood in the way of immediate war necessity was swept
aside, and today, after war necessity has been removed, there
is a strong inclination to perpetuate the measures which it
called into life.
It is therefore of first importance that both the legislative
and judicial branches jealously guard their essential functions,
yielding only where the pressure of unquestioned necessity
renders it wise to do so, and always resisting the false clamor
of misguided popular emotion.
Fairly speaking, it must, however, be admitted that ex-
President Cleveland was right when he said that the president
is t&e true representative of the people, because to him we
look to execute the laws that have been made for our pro-
tection. It should be said, I think, that his obligation is
even greater and more delicate than this bare statement would
imply. He does not execute all the laws all the time. The
multitude of our statutes has in itself rendered that impos-
sible. A rule of wise conduct would presuppose a discrimi-
nating judgment. The executive's discretion has been en-
larged by necessity until we may almost be prepared to say
that all statutes are only intended to give general authority,
to be employed by the executive when and where particular
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cases call for such action. Thus, some laws become dead letter
by the mere fact of permanent disuse. Others suffer tempo-
rary abatement in the discretion of a wise or unwise executive.
The result is that the executive department, which is now
given the power to interpret both law and fact, has greater
freedom than the courts themselves. In spite of the restric-
tion fixed by the Congress and the restraints imposed by the
courts, there is a tremendous uncontrolled discretion lodged in
the executive branch of which the president is a mere example.
Undoubtedly he is the most prominent, but the great subordi-
nate body is by far the most potent.
The ancient method of giving official recognition to popu-
lar custom, elevating it into rules of conduct, and finally
giving it the force of law, is as much invoked today as it was
in the olden days when the common law was beaten into shape.
Public sentiment always made the law, and is today just as
active and influential in that process as it ever was.
Dean Pound, in his article in the Harvard Law Review
of April, 1923, speaks of "the tendency of legislation to enact
a mere skeleton, leaving the details actually governing the
conduct of enterprises to be fixed by administrative regula-
tion, and the tendency of common speech to speak of admin-
istrative interpretation as law. Popular speech is sometimes
much nearer to reality than legal theory. It is quite possible
that new forms of law may be growing up under our eyes of
which our science of law is blindly ignorant."
I venture to submit, however, that the great difference
between the old and the modern system is that the recognition
of the results of this process has now been in much greater
measure taken over by the executive. The common law was
the growth of custom accepted by the courts in their effort to
enforce the highest possible standards which the community
could be hoped to sustain. But our statutory system has
206
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narrowed that avenue of growth, however great may be the
improvement otherwise resulting from the change. We ask
ourselves why so few successful lawyers are ambitious for
the bench. In my judgment, one explanation is to be found
in the fact that the most attractive function of the judge has
been greatly reduced. The modern statutory system prac-
tically dictates the court's decision. In a large sense the
judge has been made a recorder of prescribed conclusions.
There is, no doubt, much freedom left to find fact and to
interpret law, but generally it operates upon individual cases.
It does not rise to the dignity of establishing advanced rules
of conduct for common guidance. Under the modern system,
broadly speaking, the judge is compelled to use the man to
save the rule; but the executive is free to use the rule to save
the man.
It can not be said that the executive retained the power
which he now enjoys. On the contrary, he is charged and
entrusted under the old rule of necessity with a much larger
discretion than he was originally contemplated to have. To
deny this would in the exigency of modern development mean
little less than to stop modern government.
Here, then, lies our peril and our hope-the ancient dis-
tinction between license and liberty-with this difference,
that we are not ruled by the order of the monarch; but we are
asked to heed the voice of the people. The obvious danger is
illustrated by instances of plain denial of the law to satisfy
spasmodic enraged public opinion. Sometimes that opinion
is created by the privileged classes. Sometimes it is the
restless protest of less favored classes. We read it in verdicts,
in judgments, and in executive acts. The war abounded in
illustrations; sometimes by way of refusal to surrender indi-
vidual judgment or conscience to established order; often in
the failure to meet responsibility in obedience to law. Our
hope lies with those officials who diligently and scrupulously
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seek to employ the law for its honest intention. For the
true province of the executive is to make the written lav
work equitably. Every case has its moral value; and the
question is, has the executive the strength of character and
the practical discernment to give force to its real intention ?
We know, for instance, that presidents have employed
appropriations for the army to give relief to flood sufferers.
It is impossible to reconcile law and laecessity in such a case.
unless we resort to the old principle that a man may trespass
to save from destruction. But it is possible to find illustra-
tions that bring out more clearly the border line between
the letter and the spirit of the law; aind, for an instance, I
am tempted to resort to my own experiences. The immigra-
tion law provided that no one shall be permitted to land who
is found to be of unsound mind. There came to our shores a
Danish woman and two children to meet her husband who had
been in this country for some years. Before landing the two
children were taken with measles, and under the confusion
of our Federal and State rules, the children were taken to the
New York State Quarantine. Inasmuch as the mother did nt
have measles, she was taken by the Federal authorities tb
Ellis Island. The first thing this woman ever heard of her
children again was that they were both dead and buried. It
is needless to say that the woman suffered great mental dis-
tress. It was thought possible, if not likely, that she would
lose her mind. I saw her at Ellis Island, and do not believe
that ever in my life I saw a human being who expressed in
silent attitude more supreme contempt for anything that
authority might do. The officials thought she ought to be
rejected because of her mental condition. I decided that her
only hope for recovery was to let her join her husband; that
we were responsible for the condition in which she now was,
and that according to the true meaning of the law she must
be admitted as she was.
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Again, the law provided that any alien who had been
convicted of a felony in the country of his origin must be de-
ported if the fact of his conviction was disclosed within three
years of his coming to this country. An inspector reported
that an Italian in Nebraska who had been in this country two
years and eleven months had been convicted for felony fifteen
years before coming to our country. This man protested that
he was innocent, admitting that he had been charged with a
grave crime; that only six months had been imposed, which
term he had served; he insisted that the real criminal had been
discovered at a later date, and had been tried, convicted and
sentenced to fifteen years. Also that the witnesses upon whose
testimony he had been convicted were now his best friends
in this country, and would do anything within their power to
make amends for the injury which they had inflicted upon
him. I had the records in Italy examined, and found that his
statement was confirmed. The inspectors insisted that I had
no discretion because the man had been convicted and the
law was mandatory. I ruled that the offense was stale in
any event; but that apart from that the letter of the law should
never be used by an executive to defeat its spirit.
In each case it was natural, and perhaps this should be
the attitude of the subordinate, to abide by the letter of the
law. In each case it was, as I understood it, my province to
enforce the undoubted purpose and spirit of that law, giving
it sufficient flexibility to save it. This, as I take it, illustrates
the great problem of the modern system of executive power.
Sound discretion is the one thing that is most difficult for gov-
ernment to secure. Most of us like power. If we doubt it we
need only observe how close a conductor will permit us to
approach his car before he closes the door. The man in a
subordinate position is apt to use his power to deny. The
man in controlling position inclines to use that power to grant.
The rational combination of the two points the true way. To
secure that result we undoubtedly need ability and, above all,
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devotion to service; and, as a general proposition, this means
better compensation than the government now grants.
We level most of our criticism at high places. We com-
plain of the decisions of appellate courts and of high execu-
tives. In my opinion, the greater cause of unrest comes from
below, and most of the mischief is done there. The infinite
number of small cases with their delays and disappointments,
while not prominent enough to invite general comment, never-
theless constitute an aggravation sufficient to grow into gon-
eral unrest. This inspires opposition to authority, gives life
to the idea that the State is something apart, as it was of old,
when in truth we are bound for our own salvation to accept
that we are the State.
Successful government depends upon common under-
standing. That in turn is possible only by a degree of cont act
between the people and official representatives, which at this
time is far from perfect. We are dealing too much at arm's
length. The private citizen sees little difference between our
government and the sovereign from whose control his fathers
fled. It is my deliberate opinion that one of the chief causes
of our difficulty is the tremendous centralization of authority.
Not so much the centralization of power in the National Gov-
ernment (although that is dangerous enough) as the centrtli-
zation of administration, and that in a particular center, far
removed from the greater part of this country. As it is,
Federal authority is virtually lodged in Washington. Prom-
cuting attorneys and even grand juries take their orders.
Citizens may be indicted at the Capitol and tried there, being
put to the necessity of bringing witnesses and counsel to
attend. The Post Office Department makes its decisions at
Washington, compelling attendance for the purpose of hear-
ings. Practically every income tax case is decided at the
Capitol. It involves innumerable visits, interminable corre-
spondence; and cases are shuffled between clerks so that if
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there is prospect for a decision, it is apt to go to a new man
who may be innocent enough to call for further enlightenment.
The fact is that the representatives of our departments are
slow to recover from the war fever, and much of their conduct
still breathes the spirit of autocracy. For illustration, if the
Treasury Department decides that a contribution to the
Knights of Columbus is not a proper subject for deduction
as a charity, it is disconcerting to read on the same day that
the President has congratulated the Knights of Columbus upon
their useful and practical work in behalf of the former service
men, and expresses the hope that the coming year's effort
will be marked by the same excellent and useful accomplish-
nients that have so uniformly been achieved by this splendid
organization. The decision may be technically correct, but
the executive's recommendation is calculated to induce con-
tributions upon the opposite theory.
In my judgment, Federal administration should be de-
centralized. It should provide for competent representatives
throughout the country, so that substantially all subordinate
difficulties may be threshed out at home, without subjecting
citizens to the embarrassment and expense of a visit to the
Capitol, or employment of counsel at that point. I recall
an experience which brought home to me the disadvantages
under which people labor under our system of long distance
government. It was my custom to visit virtually every station
of any importance at which subordinates were engaged for my
department. Traveling by boat from Dawson to Fairbanks,
in Alaska, I noticed that the steamer was supplied with two
distinct classes of life boats. One class had deep keels, and
seemed to conform to all the requirements of our regulations.
The other class was peculiarly flat, and not well calculated,
to all appearances, to resist stormy weather. I inquired of
the captain what the purpose was in overloading his decks
with two kinds of life boats, and received the somewhat
apologetic answer that the one class was kept to comply with
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our rules in case of inspection, and the other class was kept to
save passengers in case of accident.
I venture, therefore, to say again that one of the chief
causes of dissatisfaction and unrest is to be found in the
fact that our government is not sufficiently in touch with the
people upon whose good will its discretion ultimately depends.
It is sometimes superficially said that whatever else may
be true of this system, the lawyer is the gainer. Perhaps he
is; as it may be said that the whole system of over-legislation
under whose burden we now labor, contributed to his profit
alone. But we must admit that so long as we are content to
tolerate such a system, our popularity with the public can
not be said to recommend it to general approval. I feel that
the responsibility of the lawyer is as great as it has ever
been; and that his activity, instead of being decreased, must
constantly be on the increase. The problem in the adminis-
trative departments is just as it was in the judicial depart-
ment. Will the lawyer be content to be a mere manager or
agent of a client; or will he accept his responsibility as an
officer of the court, or, if you please, of the government, even
while he is representing an individual interest? His re-
sponsibility for the public's respect for the government is
more immediate than that of any other citizen. His oppor-
tunity is far greater than that of any one else. As Dean
Pound says, in his article in the Harvard Law Review of
April, 1923:
"The element of most enduring effect in legal develop-
ment is professional and judicial ideals of the social and legal
order. In the transition to a new stage of growth the key
to our problem is here. We need to study these ideals scien-
tifically instead of ignoring them. We need to learn whence
they are derived, how they take form, and how they are used.
If we would avoid the temporary return to Oriental justice
which has been so marked a feature of periods of legal growth
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in the past, and is suggested today by the continual develop-
ment of administrative jurisdiction in the United States and
in England, we must learn how to supply substantially the
same ideal picture of the social order t all our judicial magis-
trates, and to make it the best, the most critical, and the most
complete that is compatible with social progress. We must
learn where such pictures are to be resorted to and where
not, and how to use them with intelligence and assurance."
The defense of the judicial system of our country can
not be left to the courts alone. They can not protect them-
selves successfully, because they can speak only when par-
ticular cases are submitted to them for decision. The real
responsibility for the system rests with the bar. By its
character, its conduct, and its preservation of the ideals will
the whole judicial system, and now, in some measure even the
executive system, be judged.
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